Although they might not care to agree with this characterization of their work, most philosophers regard moral statements as similar to opinions in that they are statements of belief about behavior preferences. Just as public opinion researchers will ask people if they prefer one presidential candidate to another, or whether abortion is right or wrong, philosophers will abstract moral words as the particular kind of qualifications of behavioral descriptions that turn them into preferences. Saying abortion is wrong is the equivalent of saying “It is my opinion that no one, regardless of their opinion on the matter, should have an abortion. Their preference should be not to have an abortion, and I am certain about that. You can list me as ‘very certain’ rather than merely ‘somewhat certain’.” Philosophers disagree among themselves about whether moral preferences are matters of taste, or instances of universal rules, just as opinions are sometimes statements of personal preferences between brands, but are also sometimes statements of presumably disinterested preferences, as when a respondent opines that affirmative action is good or bad, acting for a moment as if this were not also a matter of self-interest.